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Consumer Beware Chicago 
Eleanor M. Fox* 
Professor Hovenkamp's article, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 1 
reveals an important truth. Chicago School economics does not pro-
vide a superior roadmap to efficiency. I would take the critique one 
step further and assert: The main gap between Chicago and its critics 
is not even the design of the roadmap to efficiency. The main gap is 
social and political philosophy. 
Judge Easterbrook has written an essay in defense of Chicago and 
in response to Hovenkamp, Workable Antitrust Policy. 2 Easterbrook 
attempts to rehabilitate the Chicago School by three main arguments. 
They are: (1) The "other" economic paradigm that has informed anti-
trust - high concentration means less competition - has been dis-
credited, leaving Chicago's conception as the victor. (2) The members 
of Chicago School are not blind adherents to static models. They are 
the true skeptics who challenge unfounded presumptions. (3) Chicago 
School's critics, mired in complexities, herald an age of unworkable 
antitrust, while Chicago offers workable antitrust policy. 
I deal briefly with each of Judge Easterbrook's three arguments 
and then state what I believe to be the core differences between Chi-
cago School and its antitrust critics. Before I do, I wish to call atten-
tion to the one dominant thread of Chicago School economics. The 
thread must be seen against a background conception of law in gen-
eral, and of antitrust law in particular: The function of most law is to 
promote efficiency.3 To do so, the law should reprehend only that 
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. - Ed. 
The author thanks her colleague Harry First for helpful comments on a draft of this essay. 
The author wishes to acknowledge a debt to Chicago School, this essay notwithstanding. 
Individuals such as William Baxter, Robert Bork, Frank Easterbrook, and Richard Posner have 
made significant contributions to the law, particularly at a time when antitrust law seemed to 
have no direction except to expand. One of the major contributions by these individuals, and 
others including Phillip Areeda and Oliver Williamson, has been to insist on asking why firms 
behave the way they do, and whether their behavior might not be explained as a legitimate 
response to consumers' demands. 
1. 84 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1985). 
2. 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696 (1986). 
3. This is an easier claim for the Sherman Act than it is for most other law. Yet Chicagoans 
typically make the claim for most other law as well. See R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUS-
TICE (1981); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977). See also Judge Posner's 
opinions in Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761, 769-71 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J., dissenting in part) 
1714 
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which is inefficient.4 In commercial enterprise, an act is inefficient 
only if it lessens "economic welfare," which is the sum of producers' 
and consumers' welfare. 5 For purposes of antitrust, inefficiency 
should be defined only in terms of artificial output limitation, which is 
inefficient by definition because it blocks the flow of resources to the 
production of goods that people want. 6 Everything that is not output-
limiting is efficient and therefore is or should be lawful. 
The dominant thread is this: The heart of Chicago School is not 
its model for finding a violation. The heart is everything else. Chi-
cagoans state what the law reprehends in terms as narrow as possible. 
Chicago is not fighting a war against inefficiency. Chicago is fighting a 
war for private freedom of action. Chicago's critical contention and 
presumption that firms act efficiently is not a descriptive observation 
that produces the conclusion that almost everything is legal. It is sim-
(civil rights), cert denied, 464 U.S. 986 (1983); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Jadranska 
Slobodna Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022 (7th Cir. 1982) (torts). 
The claim that law should be allocatively efficient is derived from a conception of all goals as 
either allocative or distributive. If we concentrate first on allocation - increasing the size of the 
pie - and only secondarily on how it is distributed, the claim goes, society will be wealthier and 
therefore all people will stand to gain; and if society is not satisfied with the resulting distribution 
of wealth, it can redistribute wealth in direct ways. 
This is a value-laden set of claims. People do care about ends other than increasing their 
nation's wealth. People are willing to sacrifice the abstraction of prospective increased aggregate 
wealth for more personal benefits. People care about their opportunities, their relative rewards, 
interpersonal fairness, and mutual respect. See M. DEUTSCH, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: A So-
CIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 38-45, 50-58 (1985). Even the antitrust laws were designed 
more as rules of fairness, opportunity, and access than as a roadmap to efficiency. See Fox, The 
Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140 (1981). 
Moreover, many are skeptical of the claim that pursuit of nonallocative goals automatically 
undermines increased aggregate wealth (let alone other views of efficiency). And many know 
from experience that promises of curing unsatisfactory distributions directly are seldom met. 
4. According to Chicago School, few private acts are inefficient; people and firms are pre-
sumed to act efficiently, because they will get more money if they do. The claim that the law 
should and does reprehend only inefficient private conduct, combined with the presumption that 
private conduct is not inefficient, assures that there is little role for law. 
5. This definition - which is embraced by many economists, not just Chicago economists -
is a neat trick when combined with the assertion that "economic welfare," defined as the sum of 
producers' profits and consumers' surplus, is exactly the same thing as the consumers' interests 
that Congress meant to protect by enacting the antitrust laws. Congress meant to protect con-
sumers and others from exploitation and bullying. Congress did not value a dollar to producers 
equally with a dollar to consumers; nor did it value a dollar to exploiting producers equally with 
a dollar to striving entrepreneurs. Indeed, the whole outcome orientation reflected in the sum-
ming up of producers' and consumers' welfare is foreign to the dynamic process that Congress 
meant to foster through pluralism and diversity. See Fox, supra note 3. 
6. By this step Chicago further arbitrarily narrows the scope of transactions that may be 
caught by the law. There are other ways in which transactions produce inefficiency, in the sense 
of making people as consumers worse off. For example, if the last two suppliers in the market 
should merge, consumers would lose an element of choice, and they would lose the benefits they 
could gain by playing off one supplier against the other. They would lose the dynamic benefits of 
competitors' interaction. But Chicagoans would say that as long as entry by other suppliers is 
feasible in a year or two, potential competition is a good constraint against output limitation, and 
"therefore" there is no harm. ' 
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ply argument supporting the normative claim that people (including 
firms) should be left free to act and that there is almost never a higher 
social interest. 
I turn now to the three claims. First, Judge Easterbrook asserts 
that the previously popular economic conception - high concentra-
tion yields less competition - has been discredited and that the Chi-
cago approach to efficiency stands as the victor. (Antitrust law 
protects competition, not efficiency, but Chicago School bridges the 
gap by asserting that competition is a process to produce efficiency; 
therefore competition must be defined in terms of efficiency.) 
The association of higher concentration with lessened competition 
has not been discredited. It is true that, particularly in the 1960s, 
courts treated the association as tighter than in fact it is (but they did 
so to serve the will of Congress rather than the ends of economics). 7 It 
is also true that many economists concentrate more on entry condi-
tions than they did in decades past, and they place more stress on easy 
entry as a check on incumbents' pricing behavior. But the important 
point is that there is widespread agreement that fewness of competi-
tors (i.e., high concentration) conduces to collaborative and noncom-
petitive behavior, and barriers to entry increase the extent to which 
producers can successfully exploit consumers. Even the Reagan Jus-
tice Department merger guidelines use this model. 8 The mainstream 
economic debate does not involve a challenge to these propositions but 
rather concerns what levels of concentration are troublesome and 
when barriers exist.9 
Moreover, the Easterbrook argument implies that non-Chicago 
School antitrust economics rests entirely on the inverse connection be-
tween concentration and competition, so that if the relationship is suf-
ficiently weakened all non-Chicago antitrust falls. Antitrust has a 
broader economic base. Antitrust law rests on the expectation that 
open markets and independent action (at least where integration is not 
needed for productive efficiency) are likely to produce the most dy-
namic change and the highest degree of responsiveness to consumers. 
Much of the law is based on this expectation. Indeed, as the record 
shows, we often discover concerted behavior to suppress competition 
in fragmented markets, where by definition there is not high 
7. See United States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
8. Merger Guidelines of Department of Justice (June 14, 1984), reprinted i11 2 TRADE REG. 
REP. (CCH) 1!1! 4490-4495. 
9. See Fox, Discovering an Economic Consensus, in ANTITRUST POLICY IN TRANSITION: 
THE CONVERGENCE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 107 (E. Fox & J. Halverson eds. 1984). 
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concentration. 10 
Second, Easterbrook sees Chicagoans as the realistic skeptics and 
the critics as the true believers. He denies the static quality of the 
Chicago model and cites instances in which Chicago defers to 
dynamics. 
Chicagoans can properly see themselves as skeptics only if it is ap-
propriate to be skeptical about the law itself. Congress did not like 
certain exploitative and exclusionary conduct. 11 Congress introduced a 
presumption into the merger law that mergers between large competi-
tors in concentrated markets are bad for competition and for society. 12 
Congress did not adopt a law that says: Thou shalt not engage in acts 
that frustrate the flow of resources to their most valued use in light of 
the existing distribution of wealth and buyers' ability and desire to 
pay, and thou shalt be free to engage in other commercial acts. Con-
gress did not enact the law that Chicago insists exists. 13 
It is true, as Judge Easterbrook points out, that Chicagoans invoke 
dynamic effects and possibilities. But they do so only when reliance on 
the dynamic effect will lead to nonintervention. Thus, Chicagoans will 
rely on a free-rider effect to argue that producers should be able to fix 
resale prices. 14 But Chicagoans do not invoke dynamic effects (e.g., 
preserving rivalrous interactions to enhance inventiveness) to support 
antitrust intervention.15 Yet many economists and other observers 
suggest that dynamic interactions in a pluralist society are the hope for 
10. See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Fedn. of Dentists, 106 S. Ct. 2009 (1986). 
11. See H. THORELL!, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 164-232 (1955). 
12. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 311-23 (1962). 
13. Even if the "Chicago bill" had passed, skeptical economists, unlike Chicago "econo-
mists," would have found significant areas of the law wherein private acts do distort resource 
allocation. This is one of Professor Hovenkamp's main points: Because of Chicago School's 
presumptions of rationality and efficiency, Chicago economists find almost nothing illegal, while 
mainstream economists, willing to observe behavior and respectful of empirical research, find a 
significant role for antitrust. 
14. See Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se 
Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 10-11 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Posner, Restricted Distribution]; 
Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6-10 (1977); Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & 
ECON. 86, 91-96 (1960). 
Chicagoans ignore the dynamic effects that spring from the rule against resale price mainte-
nance. The per se rule has given birth to discounting and to mail order houses. A flourishing 
discounting business has increased the competitiveness of retail markets and has brought many 
lower-price options to consumers. 
15. To the contrary, Chicagoans see the dynamic effect as fully preserved and fostered by the 
free market. They see antitrust as frustrating dynamic interaction. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Preda-
tory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, esp. 304-12 (1981); see also Inter-
view with Robert Tollison, then FTC's Chief Economist, 43 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 
(BNA) No. 1083, at 609, 610-12 (Sept. 30, 1982) (proposing a "natural experiment" - let firms 
merge and see what will happen). 
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the future and that antitrust constraints should preserve them. 16 
Third, Judge Easterbrook charges Chicago's critics with unwork-
able antitrust policy and credits Chicago with workable antitrust pol-
icy. The difference between Chicago and its critics is not that Chicago 
offers administrable policy and that its critics offer concepts and bal-
ances so complex that antitrust cannot work. Both Chicago and its 
critics support some rules that are clear and support other rules and 
inquiries that are more complex. Chicago rejects some perfectly good 
simple rules. For example, the rule of Indiana Federation of Dentists, 17 
where the dentists ganged up on the insurers to deny them x-rays in 
assessing the claims of their patients, is a simple one that does not 
require proof of market power. Chicago, however, would require 
proof of market power. Likewise, the rule of Dr. Miles, 18 holding re-
sale price maintenance per se illegal, is clear and simple. Yet Chicago 
would overturn it in favor of a rule of reason. 19 Simplicity is not what 
drives Chicago, nor is complexity a hallmark of its critics (although it 
is the case that less law is simpler to enforce than more law). 
In his essay, Judge Easterbrook sets forth a list which, he says, 
distinguishes Chicago School from its critics.20 In my view, there is a 
different core of distinction. I think that the biggest differences be-
tween Chicago School and its critics are these: 
(1) Chicago School would apply a worldview which, if held by the 
legislators, would have assured the defeat of any antitrust law (and al-
most all other statutory law). Its critics do not. 
(2) Chicagoans believe that the most vital dynamic effects of busi-
ness action are likely to flow from letting firms do what they choose. 
The critics believe that in many cases vital dynamic effects are likely to 
flow from preserving independence of significant, viable firms and clear-
ing the path for the less-established firms' competition. 
16. See, e.g., Areeda, Introduction to Antitrust Economics, in ANTITRUST POLICY IN TRANSI-
TION, supra note 9, at 45, 56; F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND Eco-
NOMIC PERFORMANCE 407-38 (2d ed. 1980); cf. Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppe/ 
and the Incentive to Innovate, 72 VA. L. REV. 677, esp. 724-29 (1986); Hayes, Too Much Dictat-
ing From the Top: Why Strategic Planning Goes Awry, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1986, at 2F, col. 3. 
17. FI'C v. Indiana Fedn. of Dentists, 106 S. Ct. 2009 (1986). 
18. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911), applied in Monsanto 
Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984). 
19. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner (May 1983) at 
19-29, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (William F. Baxter, Jr., then 
Assistant Attorney General, on the brief); U.S. Department of Justice Vertical Restraints Guide-
lines §§ 1-4 (Jan. 23, 1985), reprinted in 48 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1199, 
Supp. at 3-11 (Jan. 24, 1985). 
Others associated with Chicago School would, however, apply a rule of per se legality or near 
per se legality to resale price-fixing. See Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of 
Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135 (1984); Posner, Restricted Distribution, supra note 14, at 22-26. 
20. Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 1700-01. 
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(3) Chicago worries most about government power. Its critics ·· 
worry equally about private power. 
(4) Chicagoans believe that efficiency is justice. Their critics don't. 
I stress point (3). Chicagoans are skeptical of the claim that 
busines power exists and endures, and they are skeptical of the view 
that government intervention can do good; their critics are skeptical of 
the view that business virtually always acts in society's interests. If 
various Chicagoans are not "true believers" in the efficacy of the free 
market, at least their anchor is: Keep the Government out. If various 
critics are not true distrusters of corporate bigness and high concentra-
tion, at least their anchor is: Be skeptical of very large size and very 
high concentration, and be vigilant to preserve opportunities for the 
nonestablished. Some critics rest their case on economics. Others rest 
on the spirit of Congress or their view of the good society. 
The anchors are the touchstones. They are the key, in a world of 
indeterminate economics. No one knows which anchor will really 
produce the most efficient society. As Professor Hovenkamp shows, 
Chicagoans cannot prove that the Chicago anchor will bring us closer 
to efficiency even as that term is defined in .Chicago's own Lex[i]con:21 
the maximum possible sum of consumer and producer welfare, or the 
maximum possible aggregate wealth of society. 
It is useful to consult Chicago's Lexicon. In the version I find on 
my bookshelf, it reads as follows: 
Good (economic): Also called "efficiency," "economic welfare," or "so-
cial welfare." Economic good is defined in terms of the aggregate wealth 
of society, because the bigger the pie the better off everyone is. In anti-
trust, good is defined in the negative. The only way in which firms can 
behave or perform in a way that will derogate from the good is to restrict 
output in the whole market - for only in this way will too few resources 
flow into the restricted market, misallocating resources and shrinking 
the size of the pie. (Of course [the Lexicon continues] firms cannot do 
this, because the free market is robust and if a firm tried to restrict out-
put a new entrant or fringe expander would make more goods and spoil 
the game. Therefore it is fair to say that what is is good.) 
The Lexicon also contains a second definition of "good." It reads: 
Good (political): Also called "political freedom." Political good means 
freedom from government intervention. The less government, the more 
freedom. While some would argue that less government means more 
freedom only for the strong, and that more government is needed to help 
the weak and the unestablished and to provide an environment hospita-
ble to their advancement, this is a false notion. There are no barriers to 
the advancement of the diligent and the meritorious, because those who 
provide what people want will be rewarded by the marketplace. There-
21. With apologies to Lexecon Inc. 
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fore there is no function for positive law, except to support the lazy and 
to glorify the mediocre. These - the lazy and the mediocre - are the 
real exploiters. See Ayn Rand, Atlas Shrugged (1957). 
For those who share the Lexicon's definition of political freedom, 
and for those who are sure it is wrong, it is clear which anchor will 
produce the most good. 
